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Abstract—Pricing telecommunication networks has become
a highly regarded topic during the last decade, in order to
cope with congestion by controlling demand, or to yield proper
incentives for a fair sharing of resources. On the other hand,
another important factor has to be brought in: there is a rise
of competition between service providers in telecommunication
networks such as for instance the Internet, and the impact of
this competition has to be carefully analyzed. The present paper
pertains to this recent stream of works. We consider a slotted
resource allocation game with several providers, each of them
having a fixed capacity during each time slot, and a fixed access
price. Each provider serves its demand up to its capacity, demand
in excess being dropped. Total user demand is therefore split
among providers according to Wardrop’s principle, depending
on price and loss probability. Using the characterization of
the resulting equilibrium, we prove, under mild conditions, the
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the pricing
game between providers. We also show that, remarkably, this
equilibrium actually corresponds to the socially optimal situation
obtained when both users and providers cooperate to maximize
the sum of all utilities, this even if providers have the opportunity
to artificially reduce their capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet, and more generally telecommunication net-
works, have progressively switched from an academic or
monopolistic network to a commercial one with competitive
service providers. In order to get a return on investment, each
provider has to define a pricing strategy to charge users for
the service they experience. Pricing has at the beginning been
seen as a way to cope with congestion, to control demand, to
deal with and satisfy heterogeneous applications with different
quality of service (QoS). It has also been regarded as a way to
introduce fairness among users with respect to the traditional
flat-rate pricing where light consumers pay as much as big
ones. Therefore, there have been many proposals for new
pricing schemes motivated by different objectives: the network
planner may want to elicit users to efficiently share the scarce
network resources in order to maximize social welfare (see,
among others, [1]–[4]), to guarantee fairness among users [5],
[6], or to maximize revenue [7]–[10]; the typical modeling tool
being that of noncooperative game theory [11]. For surveys on
pricing in telecommunication networks, the reader is advised
to look at [12]–[14].
A very large proportion of papers deal with the monopolistic
case, where there is only one provider. Though, telecom-
munication networks have become highly competitive and it
seems primordial to us to deal with that competition in pricing
models when defining the optimal prices, since competition
may highly affect the results of price determination (while
pricing in a monopolistic context generally means a single
level of game between users, competition actually introduces
an additional level of game, between providers, resulting in
a so-called Stackelberg game [11]). Some typical illustrations
of competition are:
• for wired access, DSL users can choose among several
competing providers to connect to the Internet;
• the case of wireless access is more flexible. For example a
user wishing to connect to a WiFi hotspot may be located
in a zone covered by several wireless access providers,
and can choose which provider to use for the time of his
connection.
• The same user can/will even be able to choose between
different and competitive transmission platforms: WiFi,
WiMAX, 3G, Wired operators, with a possible combina-
tion of all those ones (the so-called multihoming).
Our goal in this paper is to introduce a pricing model dealing
with competition. In our model, time is discretized, divided
into slots, and each provider has the capability to serve a given
number of packets per slot. We assume that providers do not
share a common limited amount of capacity/bandwidth, but
instead each provider has its own service capacity: it can model
for instance competition between 3G, WiFi and WiMAX
providers for instance. Note that it does not correspond to
competition at a WiFi hotspot if providers share the same
bandwidth, but rather to the case where providers are being
operated on different frequency channels and using different
PHY modes. In our model, as soon as demand exceeds
capacity at a provider, the excess demand is lost (packets are
selected randomly). We consider a pricing scheme inspired
by the (monopolist) one introduced in [15], where users are
charged for the number of packets they submit regardless of
their being treated or lost, in order to incentivize them to
limit their demand. We show existence and uniqueness of a
Wardrop equilibrium for demand at each provider for every
combination of (fixed) prices, such that each user chooses the
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provider with the least perceived cost, where perceived cost is
expressed in terms of charge and drop probability. Remark that
this kind of modeling behavior is also of interest in the case of
multihoming, when users are able to split their traffic between
providers in order to keep the lowest overall cost. From this
Wardrop equilibrium, we show, under mild conditions, that
there is a unique Nash equilibrium among competing providers
for the game consisting of setting prices, and we characterize
that equilibrium. Those prices represent a point where no
provider can increase its benefits by changing unilaterally
its price. An important property is that the resulting prices
correspond to the socially optimal situation, where the sum
of utilities of all agents in the system -including users and
providers- is maximized. This is a very desirable property, in
favor of the application of such pricing strategies, since usually
noncooperation leads to a loss of efficiency, quantified by the
so-called price of anarchy. Another issue that we address is
the interest for a provider to declare or use only a part of its
real capacity. Indeed, it may happen that, due to congestion,
serving less users, therefore at a higher market price, results
in a larger revenue. We show here that in this context of
competition, it cannot occur if demand is sufficiently elastic.
A. Related work on competition
Studying the impact of provider competition on pricing
schemes is a quite new topic which is receiving increasing
attention in the networking community. The importance of
this field has been highlighted in [16], where it was shown that
the very promising Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) scheme, which
just consists in separating the network into disjoint networks
served in the same manner but with different access prices,
does not allow service differentiation under competition at
equilibrium. In [17], a model where competitive providers play
both on price and on a QoS parameter is used, and demand
at each provider is driven by an arbitrary function depending
on the parameters of all competitors. We feel that using a
unique total demand function that is split between providers
thanks to Wardrop’s principle, i.e. all users choosing the
provider with cheapest perceived cost, is more relevant. [18]
studies competition for e-services, with also a kind of Wardrop
equilibrium, but where QoS does not depend on demand. In
other specific contexts, competition between wireless operators
in the case of a shared spectrum (more flexible and leading to a
more efficient management of the spectrum) has been studied
in [19], [20]. In [19], operators are charged by a central entity
for the amount of bandwidth they use, and therefore try to
design proper service offers for users. Competition is shown
to increase users’ acceptance probability for offered service.
Our analysis is based on a less specific network modeling
(and without competition for capacity between providers). In
[20], the authors discuss a similar competition problem, but
operators only play with the power of the pilot signals of their
base stations, and no pricing is considered. On the other hand,
note that there is an increasing bunch of works looking at
independent and selfish providers on a path, that forward traffic
of competitors to ensure end-to-end delivery [21]–[23], but do
not consider a direct competition for users between providers,
a different perspective that we adopt.
The closest works to ours are that in [24], [25], where
providers are represented by parallel links and the quality of
service is delay. The price of anarchy, measuring the loss of
efficiency due to competition with respect to cooperation, is
determined, for fixed demand in [24] and random demand
but linear delay in [25]. This is extended to the case of
parallel-serial links in [26], for fixed demand. Those models
consider that users are sensitive to the sum of the price
charged and a congestion-dependent delay, and providers are
only sensitive to their revenue. Our model is different since
we assume that the total cost perceived by a user is the
price charged multiplied by a congestion factor, the externality
being losses here (which can be considered closer to some
wireless environments). Moreover we consider that providers
experience managing costs that increase with demand, those
costs not being perceived by users.
Remark that the type of slotted and capacity-based model
we are dealing with can be related to the one in [15], where a
similar slotted capacity model is used, but with several priority
traffic classes, and in the case of a monopoly instead of an
oligopoly here. We therefore have a different goal: study price
war between providers instead of price discrimination among
users.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
our basic model and the required assumptions. Section III
describes the socially optimal allocation when all providers
cooperate, this allocation being used later on to investigate the
price of anarchy for non collaborating providers. Section IV
investigates the demand repartition among providers for fixed
prices, following Wardrop’s principle. Section V is devoted to
the Nash equilibrium for the pricing game between providers;
the quite long proof of the main result (existence ands unique-
ness) is deferred to the appendix. Finally, in Section VI, we
consider the interest for providers to artificially decrease their
capacity, and provide our conclusions and directions for future
research in Section VII.
II. GENERAL MODEL
Consider a model where time is discretized, divided into
slots. Assume that there is a set I := {1, . . . , I} of providers
in competition at an access point (I ≥ 2), provider i (i ∈ I)
having the capacity of serving Ci packets (or units, seen as a
continuous number) per slot and asking a price pi per packet.
If demand exceeds capacity at a given provider, demand
in excess is lost. We assume that lost packets are chosen
uniformly over the set of submitted ones. If di is the total
demand at provider i, the number of served packets is actually
min(di, Ci), meaning that packets are actually served with
probability min(Ci/di, 1).
Users are assumed to be charged for each submitted packet
instead of each served one in order to incentivize them to limit
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demand. The average perceived price per served traffic unit at
provider i is therefore
p = pi/min(Ci/di, 1) = pimax(di/Ci, 1).
Indeed, the total income of provider i is dipi and the total
service “rate” is dimin(Ci/di, 1), giving the unit perceived
price just above by a direct ratio. In that situation, it can be
seen that the negative externality of congestion is expressed
in terms of losses experienced by users.
We assume that total user demand is a function D(·) of
the perceived price p, and that D is continuous and strictly
decreasing with p on its support [0, pmax), with eventually
pmax = +∞. We moreover assume that D(0) >
P
i∈I Ci,
i.e. there is some congestion: the total resource available is
not sufficient to satisfy the maximum demand level. Remark
that the demand function can be interpreted in two ways (or
as a combination of those two effects):
• it can stem from user heterogeneity in their willingness-
to-pay for the service: consider a continuum of infinitesi-
mally small users with fixed demand, whose willingness-
to-pay (in terms of unit price) is distributed according to
a given distribution. Then for a given unit price p ≥ 0,
D(p) is the amount of flow generated by users with
valuation larger than p and is naturally decreasing.
• Likewise, the decreasingness of the total demand function
D can also stem from the decreasingness of individual
functions.
We can also define the function v : q 7→ inf{p : D(p) ≤ q}
(with the convention inf ∅ = 0). SinceD is continuous, strictly
decreasing for p < pmax and null for p ≥ pmax for a given
pmax then we simply have
v(q) =
⎧⎨⎩ D
−1(q) if q ∈ (0,D(0))
pmax if q = 0
0 if q ≥D(0).
(1)
The quantity v(q) is then the unit price that one has to impose
on users in order to ensure that total demand will be q (for q ≤
D(0)). The function v is called marginal valuation function:
v(q) is indeed the maximum unit price that can be charged for
the qth unit of demand without making the demand decrease:
it is a nonincreasing function since D is nonincreasing.
We finally define V (q) as the sum of the marginal valuations
of the q units of users with largest willingness-to-pay, i.e.
V (q) :=
Z q
x=0
v(x)dx.
As an example, if all users experience a fixed unit price p,
then only the q = D(p) units with valuation larger that p
will subscribe to the service, and the sum of their marginal
valuations will be V (q). We refer to this function V as the
valuation function: V (q) corresponds to the total price that
the q units of demand with highest marginal valuation are
willing to pay to be served (remark that the function V is
nondecreasing and concave). For a fixed unit price p, the user
surplus then equals V (D(p))− pD(p).
A first step of our work will be to study how, for fixed
prices pi (i ∈ I), total demand is split among providers. This
is described and characterized in Section IV in terms of a
Wardrop equilibrium.
Knowing a priori the distribution d := (d1, . . . , dI) of
demand that will result from a price profile, the goal of each
provider is, by playing on its unit price pi, to maximize its
net benefit
Ri(p1, . . . pI) := pidi − i(di),
where pidi is the money earned directly from demand, and
i(di) represents the cost for provider i of managing a demand
level di. We assume that for all i, i is nondecreasing,
differentiable and convex. Notice that contrary to the model
considered in [24], this cost is not reflected here in the quality
of service experienced by users, but is only perceived by
providers.
The price chosen by a provider has an impact on demands,
and therefore on benefits, of other providers; consequently our
model induces a game between providers. Since we consider
competitive providers, the framework is that of noncooperative
game theory. We are going to investigate in Section V,
under mild conditions, the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium for the price game, that is a price vector
p := (p1, . . . , pI) such that no provider can increase its own
benefit by unilaterally changing its access price, i.e., ∀i ∈ I,
∀p ≥ 0,
Ri(p1, . . . , pI) ≥ Ri(p1, . . . , pi−1, p, pi+1, . . . , pI).
Most of our results are valid under the following assump-
tion.
Assumption A: The marginal cost of every provider when
its demand equals its capacity is lower than the global marginal
valuation of the sum of all provider capacities. In other terms,
∀i ∈ I, 0i(Ci) ≤ v
⎛⎝X
j∈I
Cj
⎞⎠ ,
or equivalently
∀i ∈ I, D( 0i(Ci)) ≥
X
j∈I
Cj,
where 0i is the derivative function of i.
We will sometimes need a slightly more restrictive assumption.
Assumption B: For each provider i ∈ I, the following
inequality holds:
0
i(Ci) ≤
Ã
1− CiP
j 6=iCj
!
v
⎛⎝X
j∈I
Cj
⎞⎠ . (2)
With respect to Assumption A, Assumption B is more
restrictive especially if a provider has a significant “power”
in terms of capacity, i.e. if CiP
j 6=i Cj
is not negligible. In
the extreme case of a large number of providers with the
same capacity Ci = C, Assumption B simply resumes to
1563
Assumption A. In general, it is reasonable to consider that
the managing costs are small, if not negligible with respect to
the price users are willing to pay for the service. Therefore we
expect Assumption B to hold in networks where competition
occurs.
III. SOCIALLY OPTIMAL SITUATION
In this section, we define social welfare as the sum of the
utilities of all agents in the system (i.e. users and providers),
and study the maximal value of that criterion. It is well-known
in Game Theory [27] that agent selfishness does not lead in
general to a socially efficient situation. The loss of efficiency
due to the divergence of user interests, often referred to as the
Price of Anarchy [28], is an interesting performance measure
for a game: if social welfare at an equilibrium of the game
is close to its maximal value, then letting agents choose their
actions selfishly can be preferable to introducing costly control
or incentive schemes.
Definition 1: For a demand configuration d := (d1, ..., dI),
we call social welfare the quantity
SW := V
ÃX
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
!
−
X
i∈I
i(di). (3)
Social welfare SW accounts for the utilities of users (the
quantity
P
i∈I min(di, Ci) is the total effective user rate, and
the first term of (3) is total user valuation) and of providers (the
second term accounts for the costs associated to the demand
configuration). Remark that no monetary exchanges appear in
(3): this is due to the fact that such exchanges would be added
to the providers utility and subtracted from the users utility,
which would not affect the sum of all agent utilities.
We compute here the maximal value of social welfare, that
will be used as a reference in the next sections.
Proposition 1: Under assumption A, the maximum value of
social welfare is reached when di = Ci for each provider i.
Proof: The social welfare maximization problem is ex-
pressed by
max
d∈RI
+
V
ÃX
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
!
−
X
i∈I
i(di). (4)
Notice that since i is strictly increasing for all i, the
objective function is strictly decreasing in di for all i ∈ I when
di ≥ Ci, therefore our optimization problem is equivalent to
max
d∈RI+
V
ÃX
i∈I
di
!
−
X
i∈I
i(di)
subject to di ≤ Ci ∀i ∈ I.
Since V is a concave function and the provider cost functions
( i)i∈I are convex, this last problem is a classical convex
problem (maximization of a concave function over a convex
set), that can be solved by the Lagrangian method. Denoting
by λi ≥ 0 the Lagrange multiplier relative to the constraint
di ≤ Ci, the first order conditions imply that for a demand
configuration (d∗1, . . . , d∗I) maximizing social welfare, we have
∀i ∈ I, λi + 0i(d∗i ) = p∗, (5)
with p∗ := v
¡P
i∈I d
∗
i
¢
(i.e.
P
i∈I d
∗
i = D(p
∗)). Then the
complementary slackness conditions yield
∀i ∈ I, min(λi, Ci − d∗i ) = 0. (6)
Let us define I0 := {i ∈ I : d∗i = Ci} and Iu := {i ∈ I :
d∗i < Ci}, and assume that Iu 6= ∅. Then for an i0 ∈ Iu, (6)
implies that λi0 = 0, and we haveX
i∈I
Ci >
X
i∈Iu
d∗i +
X
i∈I0
Ci =
X
i∈I
d∗i = D(p
∗)
= D( 0i0(d
∗
i0
))
≥ D( 0i0(Ci0))
≥
X
i∈I
Ci,
where the second line comes from (5), the third one from
the convexity of i0 and the nonincreasingness of D, and the
last line stems from Assumption A. We reach a contradiction,
which means that Iu = ∅, and establishes the proposition.
IV. WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM FOR USERS
In this section, we investigate how demand is split among
providers when the price pi per unit of sent traffic is fixed
by each provider i ∈ I. We assume that users are infinitely
small and therefore their choices do not individually affect
the demand levels (and therefore the perceived costs) of the
different providers: such users are said to be price-takers since
they individually have no influence on prices. The outcome
resulting from such user interactions is described by Wardrop’s
principle [29]: demand is distributed in such a way that all
users choose one of the cheapest providers. As a result, the
user perceived price is the same for all providers with positive
demand, and is lower than the unit price pi of providers i with
no demand. Since we considered the case of elastic demand,
the total demand level must also correspond to the common
perceived price on all providers that receive some demand.
Those properties are summarized in the next definition.
Definition 2: For given capacity C := (C1, . . . , CI) and
price p = (p1, . . . , pI) configurations, a user equilibrium is
a demand configuration d = (d1, . . . , dI) such that for all
i, j ∈ I,
di > 0 ⇒ pimax(1, di/Ci) ≤ pjmax(1, dj/Cj), (7)
di > 0 ⇒ pimax(1, di/Ci) = v
ÃX
k∈I
dk
!
. (8)
According to Condition (7), all providers with positive demand
have the same perceived unit price, otherwise part of the
demand will have interest in changing providers. Condition
(8) states that total demand corresponds to that common value
of the perceived unit price via the demand function D.
Remark that this definition corresponds to the one provided
in [25], but for a different pricing scheme and different cost
functions. The following proposition characterizes the user
equilibria corresponding to fixed capacities and prices.
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Proposition 2: For any capacity and price configuration,
there exist a (possibly not unique) user equilibrium demand
configuration.
Moreover, at a user equilibrium d, the common perceived
unit price p of providers i with di > 0 is unique and equals
p = inf{p : D(p) ≤
X
i∈I
fi(p)}, (9)
where fi(p) := 1l{p≥pi}
Ci
pi
p. (10)
Proof: Since the perceived unit price functions for each
provider are continuous and nondecreasing, for any value of
the total demand d there exist a demand configuration d such
that
P
i di = d and condition (7) is satisfied. Moreover the
common value pc(d) of the perceived unit price at providers
with strictly positive demand is unique when total demand
is fixed (this was established in [30]) when perceived unit
prices are continuous and nondecreasing functions of demand.
It is easy to see that pc(d) is a continuous and nondecreasing
function of total demand d.
The second property, given by condition (8), that a user
equilibrium must satisfy can be expressed as pc(d) = v(d).
Since v is a continuous nonincreasing function and pc is
continuous, nondecreasing and tends to infinity as d becomes
large (pc(0) = mini pi and for d sufficiently large pc is a
strictly increasing linear function of d), then
• if v(0) ≥ mini pi then there exists a d such that pc(d) =
v(d). The corresponding value p := v(d) is unique due
to the respective monotonicity properties of pc and v.
We now prove that p verifies (9). Since we assumed that
v(0) = pmax ≥ mini pi, we necessarily have d = D(p)
from (1). Moreover (7) implies that di = fi(p), so
D(p) =
P
i∈I fi(p). Relation (9) then comes from
p ≤ pmax and the strict decreasingness ofD on (0, pmax).
• if v(0) < mini pi then there is no intersection point
between pc and v, since no user is interested in sub-
scribing to the service at a unit price mini pi. Therefore
the configuration d = (0, . . . , 0) is the unique user
equilibrium.
Figure 1 displays the demand function D and the functionP
i∈I fi for a given price configuration, and illustrates the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium perceived
price p. Function fi basically represents the corresponding
share of demand1 that provider i can get at a given perceived
price p.
Remark 1: From this proposition, we are able to character-
ize the unique perceived price p. Total demand is therefore
D(p). For all providers with price pi 6= p, demand di is
then di = fi(p). All providers such that pi = p (if any)
share the remaining demand D(p) −Pi:pi<p di, all possible
sharing providing a Wardrop equilibrium. In this sense, there
1fi is indeed the generalized inverse of the perceived unit price function
di 7→ pimax(1, di/Ci), i.e. fi(p) = sup{di : pimax(1, di/Ci) ≤ p}.
D(p)
p1 p2 p4
d1
d2
d3
C3
C4
C2
C1
p3=
unit price
p
p
qu
an
tit
ie
s
∑i fi(p)
0
Fig. 1. Wardrop equilibrium for three providers and a given price config-
uration: the common perceived price at each provider with positive demand
(i.e. providers 1, 2,3) is p = p3.
is not always uniqueness for the Wardrop equilibrium and the
corresponding revenues for each provider are not necessarily
unique. Note nonetheless that the resulting total revenue is
always the same. Moreover, we will see in the following that
when providers are at a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game,
then the corresponding user Wardrop equilibrium is unique.
V. PRICE COMPETITION AMONG PROVIDERS
In this paper, we consider that providers setting their prices
is the first stage of a two-level game, where the second stage
corresponds to users reacting according to the Wardrop equi-
librium described in Definition 2. We assume that providers
are aware of their advantage of playing first, i.e. they take
into account users’ reaction when determining their price.
This common knowledge complicates the competition among
providers, and is the purpose of the analysis in this section.
Before analysing the pricing game between providers, we
first prove a lemma that establishes some monotonicity results
of Wardrop equilibria with respect to the price configuration
p. In the following, we often compare two situations from the
point of view of one provider to study the consequences of its
price decisions. We therefore use the superscript “n” to refer
to the values (price, demand, benefit) corresponding to a new
situation in contrast to the reference situation.
Lemma 1: Consider a price configuration p = (p1, . . . , pI),
and i ∈ I. If provider i raises its price, i.e. chooses pni > pi
while all other providers j 6= i keep their price to pj , then
• the common perceived price (for providers with positive
demand) increases: pn ≥ p,
• if di > 0 then the demand of provider i strictly decreases:
dni < di.
Proof: Since pni > pi then from (10) we have the
functional inequality fni ≤ fi. Therefore, (9) implies that for
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all ε, 0 < ε ≤ p,
D(p−ε) > D(p) ≥
X
j∈I
fj(p) ≥
X
j∈I
fj(p−ε) ≥
X
j∈I
fnj (p−ε),
which yields pn ≥ p.
Now assume that di > 0 and that dni ≥ di. The equality
p = pimax(di/Ci, 1) implies that pn > p. Therefore the
demand on all links j 6= i should strictly increase to reach the
same perceived price pn. This would mean that total demand
increases, which is in contradiction with pn > p and the
nonincreasingness of total demand D.
We can now establish our main result.
Proposition 3: Assume that ∀i ∈ I, i is strictly increasing
and convex. Under Assumption B, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium on price war among providers, given by
∀i ∈ I,
½
di = Ci
pi = p
∗ ,
where p∗ = v
³P
j∈I Cj
´
, that isX
i∈I
Ci = D(p
∗). (11)
The proof is quite technical and is left to the appendix.
The proposition basically states that the only equilibrium
is such that demand matches capacity for all providers, all of
them setting the same unit price.
Remark 2: Proposition 3 establishes that the demand con-
figuration at the user Wardrop equilibrium corresponding to
the competitive Nash equilibrium of the provider pricing game
is exactly the demand pointed out in Proposition 1. In other
terms, letting providers setting selfishly their prices and users
choosing selfishly their provider yields the same social welfare
as a perfect coordination mechanism would have given. This
suggest that when congestion and competition are sufficient
(in order for Assumption B to hold), no regulation schemes
are needed since the market itself determines the right prices
and allocations.
Remark 3: If Assumption B is not verified, for example if
one provider i has a strong power in the sense that Ci >P
j 6=iCj , then Proposition 3 does not hold. In that case it
is possible that the dominating provider take benefit of its
position to improve its revenue by setting a high price pi > p∗.
VI. GAME ON DECLARED CAPACITIES
In this section, we assume that a provider i ∈ I may
voluntarily declare a false value Cni ≤ Ci of its capacity
Ci. Only the declared values Cni ≤ Ci are feasible: whereas
provider i can easily degrade artificially its service rate, it
cannot increase it above its real capacity Ci, and a false
declaration aimed at increasing one’s demand to get a larger
benefit would consequently be detected.
From the point of view of a provider’s net benefit, there are
two opposite effects of lowering one’s capacity: on the one
hand the unit selling price at equilibrium increases and the
managing cost decreases because the quantity sold decreases,
whereas on the other hand less quantity sold means less
revenue. The effect that overcomes the other depends on the
elasticity of demand, i.e. the extent to which total demand
is affected by variations of unit price. Recall that when the
demand function D is differentiable, the elasticity of demand
at a unit selling price p is defined by
pD0(p)
D(p)
.
Remark that for all p, the elasticity at p is a negative number
due to the nonincreasingness of D.
Since the demand is the inverse function of the marginal
valuation v, a small demand elasticity (in absolute value)
means that v decreases quickly with the unit price. In such
a case, a small decrease of total demand corresponds to a
large price increase, and the positive effect on revenue of un-
derdeclaring one’s capacity exceeds the negative one. The next
proposition gives a sufficient condition on demand elasticity
for that situation not to occur: if demand is sufficiently elastic
(i.e. absolute value of elasticity larger than 1), then providers
have interest in truthfully declaring their capacity.
Proposition 4: Under Assumption B, if the absolute value
of demand elasticity is larger than 1 for p ≥ p∗, i.e.
∀p ≥ p∗, −pD
0(p)
D(p)
≥ 1, (12)
then no provider can increase its revenue by artificially low-
ering its capacity.
Proof: Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to prove
that the net benefit of provider 1 always decreases when it
underdeclares its capacity. For any value Cn1 ≤ C1 of the
declared capacity of provider 1, Assumption B still holds
with declared capacities, and the equilibrium of the price
competition game is therefore given by Proposition 3. If we
define C−1 :=
P
i 6=1 Ci, the unit price p∗
n at the price
competition equilibrium is then
p∗n = v(Cn1 + C−1), (13)
each provider i 6= 1 gets demand Ci, and provider 1 obtains
demand Cn1 and gets total benefit Rn1 = Cn1 p∗
n − 1(Cn1 ).
Notice that p∗n ≥ p∗ due to the nonincreasingness of the
marginal valuation function v.
From (13), the total demand should therefore verify
Cn1 + C−1 = D(p
∗n) = D(p∗) +
Z p∗n
p∗
D0(p)dp
≤ D(p∗)−
Z p∗n
p∗
D(p)
p
dp
≤ D(p∗)− C−1
Z p∗n
p∗
1
p
dp,
where the second line comes from (12), and the third one from
the nonincreasingness of total demand and (13) which imply
that D(p) ≥ C−1 for all p ∈ [p∗, p∗n].
We then obtain
Cn1 ≤ C1 −C−1 log(p∗n/p∗) := d̄1. (14)
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From the convexity of 1 and Assumption A (implied by
Assumption B), we have
Rn1 ≤ p∗nd̄1 − 1(d̄1).
By truthfully declaring C1, provider 1 would get a net benefit
R1 = p∗C1 − 1(C1). The gain of underdeclaring one’s
capacity can thus be upperbounded:
Rn1 −R1 ≤ p∗nd̄1 − p∗C1 + 1(C1)− 1(d̄1)
≤ p∗nd̄1 − p∗C1 + (1−C1/C−1)p∗(C1 − d̄1)
= C1(p
∗n − p∗) + log(p∗n/p∗) (p∗(C−1 −C1)
−p∗nC−1) .
where the second line stems from the convexity of 1 and
Assumption B, and the third one from (14).
Define x := p∗n/p∗ ≥ 1. We can thus write
Rn1 −R1 ≤ p∗g(x), (15)
where g : x 7→ p∗C1(x−1)+p∗ log(x) ((C−1 −C1)− xC−1).
It is then straightforward to check that
• g is concave,
• g(1) = 0,
• g is derivable and g0(1) = 0.
Those three points imply that g(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 1, which
from (15) means that Rn1 ≤ R1 and gives the proposition.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed a pricing game among
service providers with fixed capacities, such that each provider
has an access price it can play with. We have characterized
how demand will be naturally split between those providers,
following Wardrop’s principle, and determined the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.
We have shown that this equilibrium corresponds to the
socially optimal point (meaning that the price of anarchy is 1),
and discussed the interest for providers to voluntarily reduce
their capacity.
There are different ways to extend the results we have
obtained. First of all, we could investigate the case where
providers share, at least partially, their capacities: does it lead
to a price war? Another interesting issue concerns the capacity
expansion game. Indeed, capacity could also be an important
parameter providers can play with, at the same time as prices:
what would be the resulting equilibrium? Finally, it would be
of interest to extend the game to a multiclass system with
different priority levels at each provider similarly to what was
done in [15] for the monopolistic game.
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APPENDIX
We prove here Proposition 3.
Proof: The proof can be decomposed into two steps:
1) We first show that the point such that di = Ci and
pi = p
∗ ∀i, with p∗ = v ¡Pi∈I Ci¢ defines a Nash
equilibrium;
2) then we prove that no other point can be a Nash
equilibrium.
Step 1: pi = p∗,∀i is a Nash equilibrium.
Note first that in order to have Ri ≥ 0, i.e., pidi− i(di) ≥ 0
at the equilibrium point, means that pCi− i(Ci) ≥ 0, i.e. here
i(Ci)
Ci
≤ v
⎛⎝X
j∈I
Cj
⎞⎠ .
This last inequality indeed holds under Assumption A in the
realistic case when i(0) = 0, due to the convexity of i for
all i.
We begin by establishing that the price configuration with
pi = p∗ for all i where p∗ is given by (11) is indeed a
Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. First notice that in this
situation, the common perceived price for users is p∗, and the
demand of each provider is di = Ci. We need to prove that in
such a price configuration, no provider can improve its revenue
by unilaterally changing its suggested price. Without loss of
generality, consider a possible move of provider 1 from p∗ to
pn1 6= p∗. We distinguish two cases.
• If pn1 < p∗ then applying Lemma 1 to a change from p∗
to pn1 we get that
– the new perceived price pn at the Wardrop equi-
librium is lower than the original perceived price:
pn ≤ p∗, because of a smaller function f1 while the
others remain unchanged.
– the new allocation dn1 at provider 1 is strictly pos-
itive, therefore from Lemma 1 it is strictly above
the original one: dn1 > C1, which implies that
dn1 = C1p
n/pn1 from (8).
Consequently, the revenue gain of provider 1 for lowering
its price is
Rn1 −R1 = pn1dn1 − p∗C1 + 1(C1)− 1(dn1 )
= (pn − p∗)| {z }
<0
C1 + 1(C1)− 1(dn1 )| {z }
<0
< 0.
• If pn1 > p∗ then from Lemma 1 we have pn ≥ p∗ and
dn1 < C1. First notice that if pn1 ≥ inf{p : D(p) ≤
p
P
j 6=1Cj/p
∗} (i.e. the situation displayed in Figure 2),
then dni = 0 and provider 1 gets a null profit, that is
lower than the profit yielded by playing p∗ as noticed at
the beginning of the proof. Therefore only the case when
dn1 > 0 needs to be proved. Actually since 0 < dn1 < C1
then we have p = pn1 > p∗, which from (8) implies that
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Fig. 2. Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 ≥ inf{p :
D(p) ≤ p
P
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
∀i 6= 1, dni = Cipn1 /p∗, and
dn1 = D(p
n
1 )− pn1
X
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗
≤ D(p∗)− pn1
X
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗, (16)
where the first line second line comes from (11) and
the nonincreasingness of the demand function. This is
illustrated in Figure 3. In that case, the revenue gain for
provider 1 is
Rn1 −R1 = pn1dn1 − p∗C1 + 1(C1)− 1(dn1 )
≤ pn1dn1 − p∗C1 + 01(C1)(C1 − dn1 )
≤ dn1
Ã
pn1 − p∗
Ã
1− C1P
j 6=1Cj
!!
| {z }
>0
−p∗ C
2
1P
j 6=1 Cj
≤ −
P
j 6=1Cj
p∗
(pn1 − p∗)2
< 0,
where the second and third line respectively stem from
the convexity of 1 and Assumption B, and the fourth line
is obtained after upper-bounding dn1 by the expression in
(16) and performing some simplifications.
Step 2: uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Now knowing that there exists a Nash equilibrium under
Assumption B, we establish that this equilibrium is unique.
Indeed, the proof of the uniqueness only needs Assumption A
to hold, as we see below.
To prove uniqueness, consider a Nash equilibrium of the
pricing game, i.e. a price configuration, and decompose the set
of providers I into three disjoint subsets: I = Is ∪ I0 ∪ Iu,
p
qu
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ie
s
∑iCi
unit price
∑i=1Ci
dn1
D(p)
∑i fi(p)
p∗ p = pn10
Fig. 3. Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 < inf{p :
D(p) ≤ p
P
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
where
Is := {i ∈ I : di > Ci}, (17)
I0 := {i ∈ I : di = Ci}, (18)
Iu := {i ∈ I : di < Ci}. (19)
It is sufficient to show that Is and Iu are empty sets, since
only the price configuration p = (p, ..., p) can lead to the
demand configuration with di = Ci for all i.
We first prove that Is = ∅. Assume it is not the case,
and consider is ∈ Is. We study the influence of provider
is increasing its unit price pis to pnis = pis + ε for ε > 0,
all other providers keeping their price unchanged. From the
continuity of the perceived unit price at Wardrop equilibrium
in terms of the price configuration, there exists ε > 0 such
that pn > pnis , which implies that d
n
is
= Cisp
n/pnis from the
relation between demand and perceived price. For this ε, the
net benefit of provider i is Rnis = p
nCis − is(dnis). Its gain
in net benefit with respect to the initial situation is therefore
Rnis −Ris = Cis(pn − p) +
¡
is(dis)− is(dnis)
¢
> 0,
where the strict positivity comes from Lemma 1 and the strict
increasingness of is . We have established that any provider
in the set Is can strictly increase its net benefit by increasing
its price, which implies that
at a Nash equilibrium, Is = ∅. (20)
Remark that Is = ∅ implies that di ≤ Ci for all i ∈ I, thus
d = D(p) ≤PiCi and consequently p ≥ v(Pi∈I Ci).
Now we assume that Iu 6= ∅, and prove that at least
a provider iu ∈ Iu can strictly increase its net benefit by
decreasing its price. We still consider a Nash equilibrium price
configuration, and denote by p the user perceived price for
that price configuration. The total demand should therefore
be D(p). Since we previously proved that Is = ∅, then
D(p) <
P
i∈I Ci =D(p
∗), with p∗ = v
¡P
i∈I Ci
¢
, therefore
p > p∗. (21)
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When there are at least two providers, at a Nash equilibrium
with Iu 6= ∅ then for all i we have di ≤ min(Ci, D(p)),
since Is = ∅ and total demand equals D(p). Moreover, there
necessarily exists a provider iu for which di < D(p): indeed
there exists at least a provider in Iu, and if this provider gets
all the demand then it implies that all the other providers have
demand 0. Thus consider iu such that
diu < min(Ciu , D(p)). (22)
We now prove that provider iu can strictly improve its benefit
by changing its price from piu ≥ p to pεiu := p − ε for a
sufficiently small ε > 0. We distinguish two cases.
• If Ciu ≤ D(p), then we easily see from (9) that the new
perceived price pε verifies
pεiu = p− ε < pε ≤ p.
By changing its price to p − ε, provider iu is the only
provider with the lowest declared unit price, therefore
from Definition 2 its demand dεiu equals Ciu
pε
p−ε , which
tends to Ciu when ε tends to 0.
• If Ciu > D(p) then for ε sufficiently small (such that
D(p − ε) ≤ Ciu), provider iu gets all the demand, i.e.
dεiu = D(p−ε). When ε tends to 0, that demand tends to
D(p) because of the continuity of the demand function.
Consequently, for a sufficiently small ε, the demand for
provider iu of switching from price piu to price p − ε can
be arbitrarily close to y := min(Ciu, D(p)) > diu , and the
corresponding revenue gain can then be arbitrarily close to
p(y − diu)− iu(y) + iu(diu) ≥ (p− 0iu(y)) (y − diu)| {z }
>0
≥ (p− 0iu(Ciu))(y − diu)
≥ (p− p∗)(y − diu)
> 0,
where the first and second lines come from the convexity of iu
and y ≤ Ciu , the third one from Assumption A, and the last
line stems from (21). Consequently, provider iu can strictly
improve its net benefit by unilaterally changing its declared
price, which contradicts the Nash equilibrium condition and
establishes that we necessarily have
at a Nash equilibrium, Iu = ∅. (23)
Relations (20) and (23) together with the demand relationP
i∈I di = D(p) imply the uniqueness of the Nash equilib-
rium: a Nash equilibrium is necessarily such that each provider
i declares unit price pi = p∗.
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